The story entering the 2010 football season for the Texas Longhorns has been centered on Mack Brown and the coaching staff's desire to transition their offense from a zone-read, spread formation to a more power-running, play-action attack. It appears the idea is to create a team consistant with the SEC model - win by running the ball and stopping teams with a vicous defense. Think Alabama, 2010. Brown saw up close what a power running game can do for you, and it looks like with the departure of the most accurate QB in Texas history (Colt McCoy), Brown and Offensive Coordinator Greg Davis are making the shift.
A number of folks may question the decision to change a system that has worked so well in Austin for the past 2 years. In 2008 - 2009, the Longhorns averaged over 40 points per game, won 25 games, lost only twice, went to a Fiesta Bowl and the BCS National Championship, and had a QB in the running for the Heisman in back to back years. Seems like the old addage "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" comes to mind.
Clearly, the offense was one of the more dominant in the game over the past few years. But if we anaylyze some of Texas's biggest wins, close games, and those two losses, figuring out why Brown and company want to transition the offense ins't all that hard.
In 2008, everyone remembers the loss to Texas Tech that kept the Longhorns from playing for a Big 12 title, a BCS title, and kept a Heisman trophy out of the hands of Colt McCoy. While the play of the year is what most people remember (Tech QB Graham Harrell to Michael Crabtree with :01 to play), and the bonehead play of the year (Texas S Blake Gideon dropping a gimme interception on the play before the miracle touchdown pass) is what Texas fans remember, it would do folks some justice to recall just why the Texas defense had to take the field in the first place. The fact of the matter is, Brown and the coaches had no confidence in a running game with the game on the line. On the Horns final drive, Texas reached the Tech 30 with just over 3 minutes to go in the game. Intead of lining up in a power offensive set, the Horns stayed in their shotgun, hurry up offense. They scored to take a 33-32 lead with 1:29 to go against a team who had at that time had scored 11 touchdowns in under two minutes in their previous 8 games. Had Texas had a consistant running game aside from McCoy, the Horns could have eaten more of the clock. As it was, they left Tech at least one second too many, costing them a conference title, a BCS title game birth, and potentially a Heisman trophy.
In 2009, their Red River Rivalry game against OU wasn't what many prognasticators anticiated - a repeat of the 2008 shoot out (a 45-35 win for Texas). Instead it was a turnover filled, hard hitting, defensive battle. It was one of those games that folks in every part of the country cringe at. Every part of the country except the SEC, where they call that hard hitting smash-mouth football. At any rate - the most telling stat of the winning team? Texas outgained OU on the ground 142 to -16. The Horns committment to running the ball in a close, turnover prone, defensive struggle earned them a time of possession advantage of almost 10 minutes, and allowed them a victory over a hated rival.
Against Nebraska in the 2009 Big Championship, the play of all star Ndndamukong Suh made headlines, but it was Nebraska's ability to close down any hope of a Texas running game that really cost the Horns. Taking pressure off of McCoy would have been a huge lift against the constant Cornhusker pressure. Instead of being able to establish any kind of running attack, Texas mustered 18 yards on the ground, allowing Bo and Carl Pelini to call a defensive game that allowed Nebraska to tee off on McCoy to the tune of 9 sacks. If not for some poor play by Nebraska's special teams (a kickoff that went out of bounds) and a silly horse caller tackle on Texas's final drive, the Longhorns would have traveled back to Arizona instead of Pasadena last year.
And of course, the 2009 BCS Championship game agaisnt Alabama is a prime indicator of just how important an effective running attack is to the Longhorns. After losing McCoy early, Texas needed to find a way to run the ball, and keep freshman QB Garrett Gilbert as cool and collected as possible against the most dominant defense in college football. Instead, the wide-eyed freshman faced numerous 2nd and 3rd and longs, and as a result had a first half most Longhorns would like to forget (1-10, -1 yard passing). While he and the offense rebounded nicely in the second half, the outcome may have been different if the Longhorn offense wasn't so one dimensional that losing McCoy ended any chance of a vicotry. It's unlikely that Alabama fans would be crest fallen if Greg McElroy went down with an injury at any point during last season, unlike Texas fans who understood the offense would fall apart without McCoy. There simply wasn't any other option.
And thus, Mack Brown decided that the 2010 Longhorns, who will in essence be breaking in Gilbert for REAL this time around, will become a more downhill running team. And face it - Texas faces two challenges this year to getting back to a BCS bowl, and perhaps another shot at the National Title. OU and Nebraska. As 2009 indicated, the games seem to hinge on the ability to own the ground game. With a power running attack, and a strong armed play action QB to keep defenses honest, the Brown running plan may well pay off. So long as Texas can execute.
Monday, August 23, 2010
CFN Repost#1: Texas Longhorns - The case for running the ball in 2010
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